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ABSTRACT 
Why do people save? A strand of the literature has emphasized the role of ‘precautionary’ 
motives; i.e., private agents save in order to mitigate unexpected future income shocks. An 
implication is that in countries faced with more macroeconomic volatility and risk, private saving 
should be higher. From the observable data, however, we find a negative correlation between 
risk and private saving in cross-country comparisons, particularly in developing countries. We 
provide a plausible explanation for the disconnect between precautionary-saving theory and the 
empirical evidence that is based on a model with a richer account for the various modes of 
‘precautionary’ behavior by private agents, in cases where institutions are weaker and labor 
informality is prevalent. In such environments, household saving decisions are intertwined with 
firms’ investment decisions. As a result, the interaction between saving behavior, broadly 
construed, and aggregate risk and uncertainty, may be more complex than is frequently assumed. 
Keywords: Precautionary savings; macroeconomic risks; informality; family firms. 
JEL Classification Number: E21; E26 
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1. Introduction 
Why do people save? This basic question, and its follow-up about the magnitude of saving, has 
occupied economists for decades. The quest for answers opened multiple avenues of research. 
One influential strand of this literature has emphasized the role of ‘precautionary’ motives; i.e., 
private agents save in order to mitigate unexpected future income shocks (Skinner, 1998; Zeldes, 
1989; and Hansen and Sargent, 2010).2 An implication of the emphasis on precautionary motives 
is that in countries faced with more macroeconomic volatility and risk, private saving rates 
should be higher (ceteris paribus). Recently, for example, Gurio (2012) demonstrated that in a 
real business cycle framework, an increase in perceived future risk leads to more precautionary 
saving, and also a shift to saving in safer assets. Nakamura et al. (2013) follow a similar 
argument, and find that the persistence of negative income shocks leads households to increase 
saving.3  
It is, however, commonly observed that saving rates in Latin America are low, and more 
specifically are significantly lower than in East Asia, even though Latin America’s macro-
economies are generally much more volatile. A careful examination of the available data, 
undertaken below, indeed confirms that casual observation. Instead of a positive correlation 
between volatility and private saving rates, we find a negative correlation in cross-country 
comparisons. In the second part of the paper, we provide a plausible explanation for the 
disconnect between ‘precautionary saving’ theory and the empirical evidence that is based on a 
model with a richer account for the various modes of ‘precautionary’ behavior by private agents, 
particularly in developing economies.  
Common features of developing countries are the under-development of the financial system, 
weaker institutional frameworks, relatively high volatility of macroeconomic aggregates, and the 
absence or shallowness of safety nets mitigating households’ exposure to risk. These factors have 
profound implications for the functioning of firms and the choices made by households. The 
                                                             
2 Other strands emphasize, for example, individual-specific determinants of saving behavior. See Cronqvist and 
Siegel (2015) for a recent summary of this literature an investigation of the genetic determinant of the saving 
decision. 
3 Fogli and Perri (2015) find an indirect evidence for this effect, by identifying the positive correlation between risk 
measures (volatility) and the accumulation of net foreign assets (a measure positively correlated with saving 
behavior). 
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institutional environment in which firms operate in developing countries induces informality in 
labor markets. This informality, together with a difficulty in establishing collateral, prevents 
entrepreneurs from accessing formal credit. Thus, entrepreneurs wishing to operate businesses 
resort to self-financing, as this is the only feasible option available to them.  
Given these structural barriers imposed on the informal sector, firms operating informally 
typically focus mostly on small-scale, unskilled labor-intensive activities (Pratap and Quintin, 
2008). Informal firms tend to be smaller, less productive, and younger than formal ones (La 
Porta and Shleifer, 2008).4 
Both self-financing and small-scale link the firm to a household’s saving and investment 
decisions, implying that the saving decisions of the household are intertwined with its investment 
decisions. This in turn suggests that the neo-classical discussion on precautionary saving that 
disconnects firms from households and investment from saving is too narrow to account for the 
various modes of precautionary behavior of agents and households.    
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between saving and risk for countries 
characterized by limited institutional depth, vibrant informal sectors, political and economic 
instability, and endogenous international mobility of the labor force. We focus on the linkages 
between the self-financed informal firms and household dynamics. In section 2 we establish the 
empirical relationship between volatility and private saving.   In section 3 we describe an 
overlapping generation model, where the family network is intertwined with the production 
process, leading to the endogenous formation of informal businesses, and the consequent saving 
and investment decisions of the household.  Section 4 concludes with a discussion of future 
extensions.  
2. The empirics of private saving and macroeconomic volatility 
Is private saving higher in countries subject to greater volatility? The operationalization of both 
variables presents conceptual and practical challenges. At the macro level, aggregate private 
saving is typically defined as the sum of household and firm saving. Household saving is the 
                                                             
4 The industrial organization that induces the large fraction of informality in developing countries has been studied 
in models that recognize the impact of capital market imperfection and segmentation, high costs of contract 
enforcement, barriers to entry into the formal sector, and other impediments (Loayza, 1996; La Porta and Shleifer, 
2008; D’Erasmo and Boedo, 2012). 
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portion of disposable income that is not devoted to current consumption. And firm saving is 
defined as cash flows –net revenues plus depreciation— minus dividends; in other words, 
“retained earnings”.5 In practice the two subcomponents of private saving cannot be separately 
identified in the data, particularly in developing countries. This is so because the presence of 
large informal sectors (which are more prevalent in developing countries) blurs the boundaries 
between households and firms; i.e., many households operate as unregistered firms. It is 
therefore not surprising that large cross-country panel datasets of national saving (e.g. the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook) do not report the two subcomponents of private saving.  Therefore, in 
what follows we will mostly refer to private saving rates, without differentiating between 
household and firms. However, for a smaller subsample, we will use data on Household saving 
rates from a recent paper by Bebczuk and Cavallo (2014). 6 
Aizenman and Marion (1999) argue that volatility and uncertainty are different phenomena. 
“Volatility” refers to the tendency of a variable to fluctuate, while “uncertainty” is present only 
when those fluctuations are unpredictable. In practice, volatility is widely used as a measure of 
uncertainty and risk. We want to capture the recurrent incidence of negative macroeconomic 
shocks that is likely to lead to higher perceived macroeconomic risk, particularly in developing 
countries; this is captured by the realized volatility measures over significant periods of time.    
In order to assess the cross-country relationship between private saving rates and macroeconomic 
risk, we estimate variants of the following basic regression: 
(1) 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖,∙ + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the private saving rate (private saving as a % of GDP) in country i at decade t; 𝑥𝑖,∙ is 
a proxy of macroeconomic risk (for the contemporaneous or previous decade); 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of 
control variables such as real income per capita, and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is an error term. Data on private saving 
rates are from the World Economic Outlook; alternatively, we use the household saving rate 
from Bebczuk and Cavallo (2014). Risk is measured as the variance of per capita real GDP 
                                                             
5 Business saving is sometimes referred to as corporate saving, retained earnings, undistributed cash flows, and the 
accumulated stock of saving as internal funds, or own funds. 
6 In a recent paper, Bebczuk and Cavallo (2014) compile all the available data from international and national 
sources and put together a dataset of private savings along with the two subcomponents. The resulting set is an 
unbalanced panel that covers 64 countries with annual data spanning the 1990-2012 period. 
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growth rate, calculated over a decade. In some specifications, we lag the macroeconomic risk 
proxy one period because the precautionary saving motives may operate with a lag.   
We start with annual data of private saving rates for 162 countries in the period 1980-20077 and 
other macro-economic controls for the same countries over the period 1970-2007. In the case of 
private saving rates, for each country we average the annual observations over three non-
overlapping decades (1980s, 1990s and 2000s)8 such that t=decade. For macroeconomic risk, we 
compute for each country the standard deviation of annual real GDP per capita growth over the 
decade. Therefore, we transform the annual observations for each country into decadal averages.9  
The resulting sample comprises a maximum of 396 country/decade observations. More details 
about the data sources and some descriptive statistics of the data are provided in Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2. 
Results for the benchmark regressions are provided in Table 1. The coefficient estimate β in 
equation (1) is consistently negative and statistically significant in the reported regressions.10 To 
obtain a visual understanding of the results, and to ensure that they are not driven by outliers, 
consider figure 1, which plots the partial correlation between 𝑠𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 (partial in the sense 
that we control for income per capita 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ) drawn from the regression results shown in column 
(1) in Table 1. Country codes are included to give the reader a sense of where different countries 
stand; the number next to the three digit country code indexes the decade (i.e., 1 = 1980s; 2 = 
1990s and 3 = 2000s). The plot shows a negative correlation between private saving and real 
GDP per capita volatility that does not appear to be driven by outliers.11 
 
 
                                                             
7 We obtained data up to 2013, but we exclude the post 2008 period to avoid biasing the averages by the impact of 
the global financial crisis. 
8 The averages in the 2000s are taken over the period 2000-2007.  
9 After we transform the data to decadal average, we check for outliers; we drop all the observations that are ± 3 
standard deviations from the median of the relevant distribution (25 observations);  in addition we dropped 7 
observations that were very close to (but within) the 3 standard deviation threshold.   
10 In unreported regressions, in the cases when the coefficient estimate is not negative, it is always statistically 
insignificant.  
11 In fact, if we remove the observations with the highest volatility (i.e., KGZ3, LTU3, and LVA3, AGO 3), the 
slope of the fitted line will be steeper. 
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Figure 1: Partial Correlation – Private Saving and Realized Past Volatility
 
The correlation is not only statistically significant, it is also economically relevant. Based on the 
estimated coefficient β, we calculate that a country that is at the 75th percentile of the distribution 
of volatility saves on average about 1 percentage point less than a country with median volatility. 
To put these number into context: if in Argentina volatility (standard deviation of real GDP 
growth = 5.4%) were to fall to the level observed in Mexico (standard deviation of real GDP 
growth = 3.6%), then private saving rates in Argentina would be predicted to be 1 percentage 
point (of GDP) higher –this is a significant figure for a country where private saving rates have 
averaged less than 20 percent of GDP over the three decades—.   
The rest of Table 1 includes several iterations of this benchmark specification, using alternative 
sets of control variables (and therefore also different sample sizes). Column (2) uses the 
contemporaneous measure of risk instead of the lagged measure; column (3) adds the real GDP 
per capita growth rate over the period (which is consistently found to be positively correlated 
with private saving rates in cross country regressions); column (4) adds in a measure of 
competition in the banking sector (motivated by the model described in the next section); and 
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columns (5)-(7) add proxies for institutional aspects that may affect private saving (again 
motivated by our model). The proxies we use here are measuring government stability, 
corruption, and law and order. Several other alternative institutional measures are included in 
further results available in Appendix Table 4. Our focus, the estimated coefficients for the risk 
measures, remain remarkably consistently measured (and statistically significant) in all these 
different alterations of the model; even though the sample size changes materially.  
We find the same basic relationship between saving rates and risk when, in figure 2, instead of 
using private saving rates from WEO we use the household saving rates available for a smaller 
set of countries from Bebczuk and Cavallo (2014). Figure 2 shows the results from column (1) in 
Table 2, and the rest of the results using household saving as the dependent variable are available 
in Table 2 as well. Again, we show several iterations including risk at different lags, and the 
inclusion of bank competition/concentration and several institutional measures (the role of 
additional institutional measures is estimated and described in Appendix Table 5). Once again, 
the results with respect to the measure of risk are very consistent (even though the sample size is 
very significantly smaller). 
Figure 2: Partial Correlation – Household Saving and Realized Past Volatility
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Figure 3 includes the same findings using the private saving information from the WEO, but 
limiting the sample to developing countries and transition economies. The full results for this 
estimation is provided in column (1) of Table 3. The results reported in columns (ii) and (iii) in 
Table 3 are focusing on different sub-samples of the complete dataset, using the private saving as 
dependent variable. Equivalent results for household saving are available in Appendix Table 3. 
We note that one suggestive finding is that the identified negative correlation between risk and 
saving (both private and household) appears mostly to be found in the developing and transition 
countries sample. The high-income country sample does not show a similar negative correlation 
(the coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant). This finding corresponds with our 
theoretical argument, enumerated in the next section, that focuses on the characteristics of 
developing countries and the reasons why risk would be negatively, and counter intuitively, 
correlated with saving in high-risk, institutionally-weaker economies. 
Finally, the last three columns of Table 3 report the results for different combination of fixed 
effects on the entire sample: (iii) country fixed effects; (iv) time fixed effects; and (v) country 
and time fixed effects. As expected, results including country fixed effects are more imprecisely 
estimated due to limited within variation in the short panel;12 however, the negative correlation is 
still present in all the regressions.   
                                                             
12 We average the annual data over decades; therefore at most there are three observations per country in the 
panel. Therefore, there is very limited within country variation in the data.   
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Figure 3: Partial Correlation – Private Saving and Realized Volatility in Developing Countries
 
In summary, we find that on average private agents save less in countries that are subject to 
higher macroeconomic risk. This basic result is robust across samples and specifications. This is 
a priori surprising because theory predicts that higher levels of risk should encourage private 
saving for precautionary motives; therefore higher realized volatility should lead to higher 
average saving rates. However, when financial markets are incomplete, safety nets are shallow, 
and institutional safeguards are weak, then private agents may choose other saving options. In 
the next section, we describe a simple model that helps to reconcile the theory with this empirical 
counter-intuitive regularity.   
3. Informality with macro and individual shocks 
Greater political instability and the absence of formal protected saving channels lead households 
to rely on substitutes to formal savings. Hoarding gold, jewelry and family heirloom works as an 
informal precautionary buffer.  Real estate, land and similar durable assets are popular means of 
saving in countries with protection of land ownership.  In countries with limited protection, 
saving in offshore locations with better protection is used frequently as a substitute for local 
saving; but offshore access is typically limited to the well-off. An alternative is for households to 
self-fund informal firms. These strategies may play important roles in the lives of households 
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with no access to a well-functioning financial system, a prevalent condition in developing 
countries.   
Similarly, non-specialized or widely transferable skills (i.e. mechanical skills, nurses, IT skills) 
provide an alternative by allowing agents to adjust to shocks by moving across sectors, regions 
and countries at times of adverse shocks. Higher educational attainment may reduce the cost of 
future learning, providing for more agile precautionary adjustments, and increasing the option 
value associated with mobility in bad times.  Therefore, in countries that are subject to higher 
volatility, agents may prefer to protect themselves by building human capital skills.   
In this section, we outline a model that will articulate more formally the role of these channels in 
explaining development and household production.  We outline a stylized overlapping generation 
model focusing on the impact of financial market imperfections on informality, dynasty’s 
education and income decisions in the presence of macro uncertainty.  The model extends the 
Galor and Zeira (1993) framework (see Basu, 1997, for an overview of the model and related 
literature).   
We assume a two period life span for each member of the household, where consumption - c, 
and bequest to the household’s children - q, take place in adulthood, the second and last period of 
life.  Each generation lives for two periods. In the first period, youth, children have the 
opportunity to enter the labor force as unskilled workers, earning in both periods of their life the 
low unskilled wage, .  Alternatively, they may acquire in period I human capital at expense h, 
thereby becoming skilled workers in period II, having the capacity to run and mange a family 
business, referred to also as the family firm.  The cost h covers the expenses of formal education, 
or informal education via learning by doing, or an apprenticeship. Their investment in human 
capital is funded and determined by their parents, aiming at maximizing a utility that depends 
both on parental consumption, and parental bequest to their children. 
In the second period, adulthood, unskilled workers will keep earning the low unskilled wage, . 
The educated workers are employed as skilled workers, running the family firm.  They either 
take on an existing family business (replacing their parent), or start a ‘greenfield’ family firm.  
The second period is also the time when children are raised, bequest and children’s education 
decisions are made.  
uw
uw
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Households’ utility u is a Cobb Douglas aggregator with consumption and bequest weights of  
and 1 - , respectively.  To simplify the analysis, we assume that consumption takes place only 
in adulthood: 
(1)      
The productivity of the family firm reflects the status as either an established/formal or a 
greenfield/informal firm, denoted by and the macro shock, .   
Specifically, parents that operated an established family firm may transfer intangible capital to 
the family firm run by their educated descendents.  Henceforth we index these households by 
 (e for established).  This intangible capital reflects the advantage associated with an 
established family firm - clientele, reputation, legal status etc. - increasing the firm’s productivity 
at a rate of  above the productivity of a ‘greenfield,’ new firm ( ). Thus, history matters by 
determining the direct bequest - q, and the family firm’s productivity.  Parents working as 
unskilled workers in adulthood may invest in the human capital of their children, enabling them 
to operate a ‘greenfield’ family firm, indexed by .  
At this stage, we ignore the possibility of simultaneous investment in human and physical 
capital, and other forms of market imperfections.  In the Appendix we study the impact of adding 
investment in tangible capital, and the presence of borrowing constraint due to limited 
pledgeability of capital as collateral.  The Appendix shows that these added features do not 
impact the qualitative results of our model. 
The benchmark model assumes that households’ skilled adults are endowed with one unit of 
specific capital, the output of which is  
(2)             
where denotes the firm’s productivity: 
;                                                          
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The term  is the macro shocks:    in booms, or in recessions, .  To 
simplify, we assume that macro shocks are independently distributed over time, with equal 
probabilities of recessions and booms.   
The Cobb-Douglas utility implies that a household’s second period income, y, is divided 
between consumption, c, and bequest, q: 
 (3)         , and ,  . 
The household’s income reflects the education choices, being ( ) if the children work as 
unskilled (skilled) workers, respectively: 
(4)    
(4’) . 
The household’s education decisions can be reduced to maximize the second period expected 
income.  If the household self-finances the education [i.e., if q > h], the second period income 
from the bequest net of h would be .  If the household funds the education by 
borrowing q – h, the second period income would drop by the debt service, . 
Thereby, the household would educate their children only if   
(5)  . 
We focus on the case where the unskilled wage is low, and the financial system is 
underdeveloped to such a degree that investment in human capital pays for a household that can 
self-finance it.  Yet, the poorest households would find the financial spread too prohibitive; 
thereby their children would be unskilled.  This would be the case when
.   
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Figure 4 plots the association between the children’s bequest and their expected income in 
adulthood, as reflected by equations (4) and (4’).  The solid line, Y(u), plots the expected 
unskilled household income as a function of its bequest.  The dotted line, Y(s, greenfield) plots 
the expected income of a skilled household engaging in greenfield investment, where the parents 
were unskilled, hence the productivity of the resultant firm is A.  The broken line, Y(s, 
established) plots the expected income of a skilled household running their household established 
firm, where the parents were skilled workers running the family firm, with productivity A(1 + a).          
The slope of the Y(s, ..) line is in the range where the education expense is co-funded by 
borrowing  (where q < h), and if the education is self-funded.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: bequest and expected adulthood income 
 
Maximizing the expected income implies that unskilled households contemplating greenfield 
investment would fund it only if the bequest exceeds the threshold qu ; whereas households with 
established firms would fund their children’s education and keep the family firm if the bequest 
exceeds the threshold qs.  The gap between the two thresholds reflects the ‘head start’ advantage 
of established firms.    
i1
r1
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We denote by the expected bequest in adulthood of a household with parental bequest q. The 
bequest dynamics can be inferred by using equations (1)-(5). For households that invest in 
human capital, equations (3) and (5) imply that: 
(6)    . 
For households supplying the unskilled labor, the bequest dynamics is: 
(7) . 
Equations (6) and (7) allow us to characterize the dynamics of the system.   
Case 1:  No Uncertainty; no Productivity Advantage 
To simplify, we focus first on the benchmark case where there is no macro uncertainty, , 
and there is no productivity advantage to ‘established’ firms, a = 0.  Unskilled households would 
be equally indifferent to investing in their children versus staying unskilled if the two options are 
associated with the same expected future income: .  This equality 
defined a bequest threshold of qu, below which children will be unskilled workers, 
.  The threshold bequest level qu increases with the cost of external 
financing  i, with the education cost  h, and the with opportunity cost of education, the unskilled 
wage. 
We assume that , as is the case when the marginal propensity to 
bequest across generations is below 1; and that , as is the case when 
the borrowing interest rate is large, so that marginal investment financed externally reduces the 
bequest by more than one.  In these circumstances, the dynamic bequest lines may cross the 45 
degree ray 3 times, at points ql ,  q* , and qh , as is depicted by Figure 5. Henceforth we will 
focus on this case, as it provides a rich benchmark associated with multiple equilibria, where the 
dynamics of households are determined by their initial income.  The cases where the dynamic 
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bequest curve has a unique intersection with the 45 degree ray can be analyzed as limiting cases 
of this framework.  
Figure 5: Bequest dynamics, no macroeconomic uncertainty 
 
The dynamic evolution of relatively poor households, q < qu , summarized by equation (7), is 
depicted by the dotted curve intersecting the 45 degree ray at ql.  This intercept is the long run 
equilibrium of the poorer households - their initial low wealth propagates low wage, an unskilled 
equilibrium for their dynasty.  For h > q > qu, the bequest is high enough to induce households to 
educate their children, co-funded by external borrowing.  The intertemporal bequest dynamics of 
these households are portrayed by the bold curve, intersecting the 45 degree ray at q = q*.   For 
relatively affluent households, q > h, thereby the human capital investment is self-financed, and 
the marginal propensity to bequest across generations is .  The bequest 
dynamics of these households is depicted by the third, bold segment, intersecting the 45 degree 
ray at q = qh. 
The key message of Galor and Zeira (1993) is summarized by figure 5: differential bequests 
across otherwise identical households may lead to divergent long run outcomes, where the long 
run equilibrium is characterized by a bipolar distribution of unskilled poor households 
converging to q = ql , and skilled relatively affluent ones converging to q = qh. In the absence of 
uncertainty, households whose bequest exceeds q* will educate their children, converging 
overtime to the high bequest equilibrium, where q = qh.  In contrast, households whose bequest 
)1)(1(/1 rdqdq  
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is below q* will converge overtime to the low bequest equilibrium, where q = ql.   Point q* is an 
unstable equilibrium.  In the absence of macro shocks, households below q* (above q*) will 
converge to the low bequest, unskilled equilibrium at ql  (high bequest, skilled equilibrium at qh), 
respectively. 
In the context of the model, the bequests are the saving of the households over that period. 
Therefore, if the private saving rate in a period is above a threshold, overtime the saving rate of 
will converge to a relatively high steady state equilibrium. Instead, if the saving rate is below the 
threshold, then the saving rate will converge overtime to a lower steady state equilibrium.   
Case 2: Productivity Advantage for Established Firms 
The above analysis focused on the case of a = 0, which is also the situation facing ‘unskilled 
households’ – households where parents were employed as unskilled labor, thereby investing h 
in their children would result in a greenfield investment.  Suppose now that a > 0, thereby, 
established firms have a productivity advantage.   Similar analysis applies for the established 
households, where past investment in the family firm provides productivity bonus a, thus
.  We review this case with the help of Figure 6, where the lower three segments 
curve describes the bequest dynamics of the unskilled households, depicted earlier in Figure 5. 
Applying (6) and (7), a bonus a shifts upwards the second and the third segments of the dynamic 
bequest curves of the ‘established’ households above that of the unskilled households, from the 
bold segments in Figure 3 to the lighter dotted segments. Thus, the threshold q* shifts for the 
‘established’ households leftwards to q’.  The children of ‘established’ households, for q above 
q’, will keep educating their children, converging to the ‘relative affluent,’ skilled long run 
equilibrium at point qe.   In contrast, the children of unskilled households, for bequest q in the 
range q’ < q < qu, will end up unskilled, and their dynasty will converge to a long run 
equilibrium of relative low saving at point ql.   
Applying (6), we infer that an unstable equilibrium is the solution for 
, the value of which differs between the skilled and the unskilled 
households: 
)1( aAax 
)]1)(()[1( ihqaq x  
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(8)         ; and      
Higher productivity of the household firm and lower financial spread reduce q’ and q*, thereby 
increasing the range of ‘specialized’ skilled households, and the mass of the households that will 
converge to the high bequest, skilled equilibrium.13 
Adding the productivity advantage of ‘established’ household also changes the dynamics of 
‘unskilled’ households, as educating their kids would switch the household status from 
‘greenfield’ to an ‘established’ one.  Thereby, for q > qu, the bequest of their educated children 
at their adulthood, q+1, will be determined along the dotted and lighter mid segment (the one 
intersecting the 45 degree ray at q =  q’), as the grandchildren of the ‘uneducated’ households 
will be born to already ‘established’ households.  This in turn implies that all households whose 
bequest is above qu will converge to a ‘relative affluent’ equilibrium, qe.  History matters: 
established households, whose bequest q is on the ‘bold line’ (i.e., q’< q < qu), will converge to 
the high bequest, relative affluent long run equilibrium.  Equal bequest q by the unskilled parents 
will not be enough to support investment in human capital, and these households will converge 
to the unskilled, low bequest, unskilled long run equilibrium, where q = ql.     
Figure 6: Established versus ‘greenfield’ household bequest dynamics 
                                                             
13 Lower financing costs i will increase the range of specialized skilled household as long as  , as 
will tend to be the case for relatively productive firms. 
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In summary, adding a productivity advantage for established firms does not change the key 
message of Galor and Zeira (1993): differential bequests across otherwise identical households 
may lead to divergent long run outcomes. The main difference though is that the long run 
equilibrium is characterized by a multipolar distribution; and in this case, the same bequest (i.e., 
saving) could lead to different long-run equilibriums.   
Case 3: Macro Shocks 
The above analysis sets the ground for dealing with macro shocks.  So far, we covered the case 
where the dynamic bequest curves focused on the association of the bequest provided by the 
parents in period I, q, and the expected bequest provided by their children in adulthood in period 
II, q+1,  to the grandkids of the grandparents giving the bequest in period I.  We focus now on the 
impact of the realized macro shocks taking place in period II on the actual bequest determined in 
period II, drawing now the association between the bequest in period I, and the actual bequest in 
period II, determined after the realization of the macro shock in period II.   
Consider first the impact of a recession shock impacting the economy at time +1 (period II of the 
generation born in period I), .  Equation (6) implies that the recession shock shifts the 
second and the third segment downwards by .  The impact of the shift is reported in Figure 7.  
The 3 bold segments are the benchmark, reporting the dynamic adjustment of the ‘established’ 
household in the absence of macro shocks, which coincides also with the expected dynamic 
adjustment.  Households with a bequest exceeding q’ will converge over time to the relatively 
 m
A
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affluent ‘established’ equilibrium associated with bequest qh, whereas households with bequest 
below q’ will converge overtime to the unskilled, low saving equilibrium with bequest ql.   The 
adverse macro shock shifts the two upper segments of the bequest curve q
+
 downwards, to the 
dotted lines.  Consequently, the critical value of the bequest level dividing the households into 
the long-run unskilled, and the skilled equilibria shifts rightwards, from q’ to q”.  Households 
whose bequest q is in the bold segment defined by q’ < q < q” will have converged to the skilled, 
high bequest equilibrium in the absence of the recession shock.  Following the recession shock, 
these households will converge to the unskilled, low bequest and low income equilibrium, where 
q = ql.  If macro shocks are persistent, the recessionary shock may induce large costs, pushing 
the mass of households in the bold segment towards to the ‘low saving’ equilibrium.   
Figure 7: adverse macro shocks and the dynamics of the ‘greenfield’ households 
 
A similar analysis applies for the ‘unskilled’ households.  In terms of Figure 6, the recession 
shock shifts the two segments associated with investment in human capital 
downwards/rightwards, resulting in higher values of the equilibrium thresholds qs , q’ , qu , and 
q*.  The recession shock implies the rise of ‘recession children,’ in households that flipped their 
status from skilled, converging towards higher income, to unskilled, converging towards low 
saving.  
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In short, the impact of recurrent negative shocks is to move the relevant thresholds to the right; 
meaning that for any given bequest (i.e., saving over the period) it is more likely that a household 
will end up in the low saving equilibrium. This will push a larger mass of individuals to the low 
saving equilibrium; thereby resulting in a lower aggregate private saving rate in the economy.  
Therefore, a key insight of this model is that higher volatility may lead to lower aggregate saving 
rates. This is not at odds with precautionary saving theory; it simply expands the theory to 
encompass other modes of ‘precautionary’ behavior by private agents. 
Case 4: Migration and Remittances 
In bad times, deeper family networking allows selected members to move to other countries or 
provinces, sending back home remittances, while the extended household compensates for their 
absence by reallocation of chores at the level of in-household and informal firm production. This 
mechanism provides precautionary insurance, at times when the informal family firm may face 
losses stemming from a recessionary decline in demand and prices.  Furthermore, the higher 
saving may allow further self-investment in the family firm. One may view this as a family level 
financial intermediation; activities that tend to be under reported as they are done within the 
extended household production.  The macroeconomic importance of this channel was highlighted 
by the IDB (2011) report. It provides information about the growth and persistence of remittance 
flows to Latin American and Caribbean the 2000s.14 Frequently, educated and experienced 
workers have access to better outside options, buffering the household with remittance income.   
We describe now the way an outside option of temporary immigration may impact the effect of 
the recession shock. For simplicity, assume that each family has two children. The firm’s output 
(2) takes place if both siblings are employed, dropping to if only one runs the family 
firm.15  Specifically, suppose that each of the two siblings in a household that invested in their 
                                                             
14 Remittances flows to LAC increased from US$ 28 billion in 2003, peaking at US$ 65 billion in 2008, dropping to 
US$ 56 billion in 2009, and recovering more than half of the drop within two years, reaching US$ 61 billion in 
2011. 
15 For example, let us denote the household effort in the family firm by L, and normalize the effort supplied by all 
household members to 1.  Thereby, the household firm produces  with a full household effort, 
dropping to  if only half of the household’s effort is devoted to the firm.  This may be the case in 
)1( ma   
1)1( ma  
5.0)1( ma  
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human capital can also provide remittances of by working as a guest worker. Assume also 
that in good times, both siblings are better off running the family business, but in recessions, they 
would benefit by sending one of them to exploit the outside option.  This would be the case for 
the ‘established household’ if .   
In these circumstances, the established family firm would be run and maintained by one of the 
siblings; the other would support the household by remittances.  Exploiting the outside option 
mitigates the recessionary shock, increasing the household income in bad times by 
, shifting upwards the dotted segments in Figure 7, mitigating the 
adverse consequences of the recession.  Large enough  and  would reduce the mass of the 
households in the bold section, households that otherwise would be pushed from skilled status 
towards low saving.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
We explored what we view as a fundamental puzzle in our understanding of the motivations for 
saving as they manifest in countries characterized by institutional and regulatory environments 
and constraints that are frequently found in the developing world. In particular, we have focused 
on the observed but counter-intuitive negative correlation between volatility and private sector 
saving. The standard view hypothesizes a positive correlation, in that private actors living in 
countries with a more volatile macro-economy or higher aggregate risk are expected to engage in 
more precautionary behavior and save more. In fact, we observe that the statistical association is 
reversed, and we find lower private saving rates observed in more volatile places.  
We suggest a theoretical model that incorporates the limiting institutional environment that 
characterizes middle- and low-income countries, and explore the implications of these 
constraints to private sector saving behavior. The private sector is modeled as an interaction of 
consuming households with family-owned informal firms who themselves attempt to maximize 
their lifetime income (including a bequest motive). 
                                                             
a divided household, if during a recession half of the household immigrates and works as a guest worker, thereby
.  
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Two important issues merit further consideration. First, our theoretical and empirical analysis 
assumed that the degree of aggregate risk is not itself dependent on the private sector’s saving 
choices. Low-skilled intensive production, for example, might be more exposed to terms-of-trade 
shocks, so the implied saving and precautionary saving and investment decisions of 
household/firms do have an impact on aggregate volatility and future risk. There are, therefore, 
good reasons to motivate a more complete investigation of the feedback mechanisms between 
the two aggregates that this paper focused on. 
Second, we expect that some of the considerations outlined above will change in more open 
economies. Our model assumed some form of international labor mobility (in the last section), 
but we did not examine the implications of more open capital markets. Further capital market 
openness may ameliorate some of the programs inherent in the shallow credit markets of lower 
income countries, but may also generate further sources of volatility that needs to be accounted 
for. To summarize, our central message is that the interaction between saving behavior, broadly 
construed, and aggregate risk and uncertainty, may be more complex than is frequently assumed, 
and we aimed to demonstrate that using both the observed empirical regularities and a formal 
model.  
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Regressor (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
-0.51*** -0.65*** -0.42** -0.43*** -0.42** -0.45***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.37**
(0.05)
0.97***
(0.00)
-0.07***
(0.01)
0.65**
(0.02)
0.26
(0.56)
1.42***
(0.00)
0.17*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.64)
16.44*** 15.75*** 15.59*** 21.50*** 12.31*** 16.29*** 12.92***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 335 382 335 210 278 278 278
R-squared 0.13 0.09 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.14
Table 1: Private Saving and Risk
Dependent variable is Private Saving over GDP
Risk (t)
RGDP per cap growth (t)
Bank Concentration (t)
Risk (t-1)
This  table reports  results  relating average private saving rates  to macroeconomic risk. Al l  regress ions  control  for Real  GDP per capita  (level ). 
Depending on the speci fications , the regress ions  a lso control  for  rea l  GDP per capita  (growth rate), index of banking sector concentration, 
proxies  of insti tutional  qual i ty from ICRG. The panel  spans  the 1980-2007 period; however annual  data was  transformed into decadal  
averages . Method of estimation is  Pooled OLS. Al l  speci fications  are estimated with robust s tandard errors  (p va lues  in parenthes is ).  *, **, 
*** indicate s igni ficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels , respectively. 
Constant
Law and Order (t)
Corruption (t)
Government Stability (t)
Real GDP per capita (t)
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Regressor (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
-0.38 -0.46 -0.45** -0.43* -0.39 -0.49*
(0.10) (0.13) (0.01) (0.08) (0.14) (0.05)
-0.29*
(0.10)
0.19
(0.56)
-0.04
(0.32)
-0.80*
(0.06)
0.71
(0.23)
1.10**
(0.02)
-0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.07* -0.10**
(0.56) (0.93) (0.54) (0.91) (0.43) (0.09) (0.05)
9.47*** 8.26*** 9.28*** 10.89*** 16.37*** 7.81*** 6.32***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 94 103 94 79 88 88 88
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.07
Dependent variable is Household Saving over GDP
Table 2: Household Saving and Risk
This  table reports  results  relating average household saving rates  to macroeconomic risk. Al l  regres ions  control  for Real  GDP per capita l  
(level ). Depending on the speci fications , the regress ions  a lso control  for  rea l  GDP per capita  (growth rate), index of banking sector 
concentration, proxies  of ins i tutional  qual i ty from ICRG. The panel  spans  the 1980-2007 period; however annual  data was  transformed into 
decadal  averages . Method of estimation is  Pooled OLS. Al l  speci fications  are estimated with robust s tandard errors  (p va lues  in parenthes is ).  
*, **, *** indicate s igni ficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels , respectively. 
Law and Order (t)
Real GDP per capita (t)
Constant
Government Stability (t)
Corruption (t)
Risk (t-1)
Risk (t)
Bank Concentration (t)
RGDP per cap growth (t)
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Regressor (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
-0.50*** 0.42 -0.22 -0.52*** -0.16
(0.00) (0.44) (0.25) (0.00) (0.37)
0.39*** -0.17*** -0.20* 0.17*** -0.38***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
15.32*** 24.81*** 27.46*** 16.33*** 36.51***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sample
Developing & 
Transition
Advanced 
Economies
All Countries All Countries All Countries
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 259 76 335 335 335
R-squared 0.06 0.17 0.82 0.13 0.83
This  table reports  results  relating average private saving rates  to macroeconomic risk. The regress ions  
control  for  rea l  GDP per capita l  (level ). Column (i ) corresponds  to the subsample of developing and 
trans i tion economies ; column (i i ) corresponds  to the subsample of advanced economies ; Column (i i i ) i s  the 
regress ion with country fixed effects ; column (iv) i s  the regress ion with time fixed effects ; and column (v) i s  
the regress ion with country and time fixed effects .  The panel  spans  the 1980-2007 period; however annual  
data was  transformed into decadal  averages . Method of estimation is  Pooled OLS, including dummies  for FE. 
Al l  speci fications  are estimated with robust s tandard errors  (p va lues  in parenthes is ).  *, **, *** indicate 
s igni ficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels , respectively. 
Real GDP per capita (t)
Constant
Table 3: Private Saving and Risk, alternative specifications
Dependent variable is Private Saving over GDP
Risk (t-1)
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Appendix 
I. Theory 
This appendix extends the model outlined in Section 2.  First, we allow for investment in 
physical capital, K.  Next, we modify the assumptions governing financial intermediation, 
focusing on the case where borrowers face a credit ceiling determined by the pledgeability of 
capital. 
A1. Investment in physical capital 
Consider the case where the household firm production function, (2) in the paper, is modified by 
adding capital, K: 
(A1)    
The timing of investment is similar to the benchmark model: the parents are investing today in 
the human and physical capital of their children.  In their adulthood, the parental investment will 
allow the children to operate the family firm.  For simplicity, we assume that physical capital 
depreciates fully at the end of each production period, while the intangible firm specific capital 
does not.  We maintain all the other assumptions.  The income of the household investing in the 
family firm, (4’), is modified to:  
 (A2) . 
The modified expected bequest dynamics are: 
 (A3)               . 
For the household supplying the unskilled labor, the bequest dynamics remain 
(A4) . 
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The household that invests in the family firm chooses the physical capital K by maximizing the 
expected next period household income.  With Cobb Douglas preferences, this is also akin to 
maximizing the expected future bequest, the right hand side of (A3), resulting in the following 
first order conditions: 
(A5)    . 
Applying them to (A3) the bequest dynamic equations can be reduced to  
(A3’)   . 
Note that the bequest dynamics (A3’) are almost identical to the ones in section 2, replacing the 
firms output in (7), , with the firm’s output net of physical capital cost,   
or (the first is the case for external financing, the second is the case for internal 
financing).  Consequently, the discussion of Section 2 remains applicable with endogenous fiscal 
capital.   
A2. Collateral constraints 
 We conclude the appendix extending the analysis to the case where the supply of credit is subject 
to collateral constraints.  Specifically, assume that the legal system provides creditors with 
limited protection in the form of a collateral constraint  -  a fraction of future output is 
pledgeable.  Thereby, the supply of credit at cost i is subject to the constraint that future 
repayment will not exceed a fraction of the expected firm’s output 
(A6)      . 
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We maintain all the other assumptions.  For a high enough bequest, or for a high enough , the 
collateral constraint is not binding, and the analysis above holds.  In terms of Figure 4, the first 
and the last segments of the intertemporal bequest curve are not impacted by the collateral 
contestant.  If the collateral constraint is not binding at the low bequest levels, inducing 
households to switch from ‘unskilled’ to ‘skilled’ workers running the family firm, than the 
presence of the collateral constraint does not change the above analysis.   
Consider now that the collateral constraint binds at the bequest threshold associated with the 
switch from unskilled to skilled households (qu or qs in terms of Figure 3).  As long as the 
collateral constraint binds, the constraint defines the stock of capital as an implicit quadratic 
function of the bequest and of other parameters: 
(A7)   . 
Solving the quadratic equation, we find that 
(A8) . 
The dynamics of the bequest in the range where the collateral constraint binds are given by 
(A9)  . 
Applying (A7) and (A8) to (A9), collecting terms, we infer that the intertemporal bequest 
dynamics, , are given by 
(A10)   
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Thereby, as long as the collateral constraint binds, the second segment of the dynamic bequest is 
upward sloping and concave: .  For a bequest high enough to relax the 
constraint, the bequest curve becomes linear.   
Applying the above, we conclude that for a high enough collateral rate, , the constraint is not 
binding, and the bequest curves are identical to the ones depicted in Figures 3 and 4, piecewise-
linear.  For a low enough , once the constraint is binding, the mid-segment is concave, as is 
depicted by the bold curve in Figure 5, where Kr is the demand for capital at interest rate r, 
corresponding to the case of self-funded capital.  Depending on the parameters’ values, the last 
segment may also start at q below h + K, as is depicted by the dotted segments. 
Subject to this modification, the logic of the discussion in Section 2 continues to hold, and 
adding collateral constraints does not impact the qualitative results of our analysis.16   
 
                                                             
16 Once binding, the collateral constraint may impact the quantitative results – a tighter constraint (a lower ) will 
increase the bequest associated with switching from unskilled to skilled households [higher qs and qu in Figure 3], 
and will tend to increase the values of q’ and q*. 
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Figure A1: collateral constraints and the bequest dynamics. 
II. Data and Tables 
Appendix Table 1: Data Sources 
Variable Description Source 
Private Saving Percentage units of GDP WEO Database 2014 
Household Saving Percentage units of GDP Bebczuk and Cavallo (2014) 
Risk Standard deviation of yearly real GDP per capita growth rate WDI Database 
GDP per capita Constant 2000 USD WDI Database 
Bank 
concentration 
Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking 
assets.  
Bankscope 
Government 
Stability 
An assessment of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its 
ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents 
(Government Unity, Legislative Strength & Popular Support). A score of 12 points 
equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
An assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain 
government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of 
three subcomponents (Unemployment, Consumer Confidence & Poverty), A score of 
12 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Investment Profile 
An assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by 
other political, economic and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the 
sum of three subcomponents (Contract Viability/Expropiation, Profits Repatriation & 
Payment Delays). A score of 12 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points 
to very high risk. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Internal Conflict 
An assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on 
governance. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (Civil 
War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence & Civil Disorder). A score of 12 points 
equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
External Conflict 
The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent 
government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure 
(diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, 
sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). The 
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (War, Cross-Border Conflict & 
Foreign Pressures). A score of 12 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 
points to very high risk. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Corruption An assessment of corruption within the political system.  ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Military in Politics 
Lower risk ratings indicate a greater degree of military participation in politics and a 
higher level of political risk. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Religion in Politics 
Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or governance by a 
single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude 
other religions from the political and/or social process; the desire of a single religious 
group to dominate governance; the suppression of religious freedom; the desire of a 
religious group to express its own identity, separate from the country as a whole.  
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Law and Order 
Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to 
three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of 
popular observance of the law. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Ethnic Tensions 
An assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, 
nationality, or language divisions. Lower ratings are given to countries where racial 
and nationality tensions are high. 
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Measures how responsive is the government to its people.  ICRG: TABLE 3B 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and 
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services.  
ICRG: TABLE 3B 
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WDI: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
WEO: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
ICRG: International Country Risk Guide Published by The PRS Group. 
 
 
 
 
mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd N
Private Saving 15.8 -6.4 10.9 16.4 21.2 38.5 7.8 382
Household Saving 7.6 -4.0 4.7 7.1 10.2 23.9 5.0 103
Risk 3.5 0.5 1.7 2.9 4.6 16.0 2.4 388
Real GDP per capita 8.2 0.1 0.7 2.6 10.3 64.0 11.9 388
RGDP per cap Growth 1.7 -9.9 0.1 1.8 3.2 13.9 2.8 388
Government Stability 7.6 2.6 6.6 7.6 8.8 11.2 1.7 306
Corruption 3.1 0.0 2.2 3.0 4.0 6.0 1.3 306
Law and Order 3.7 0.8 2.5 3.7 5.0 6.0 1.4 306
Socieconomic conditions 5.7 0.4 4.4 5.6 6.9 10.7 1.9 306
Investment Profile 7.2 2.1 5.8 6.9 8.4 11.8 2.1 306
Internal Conflict 8.8 0.4 7.4 9.3 10.7 12.0 2.4 306
External Conflict 9.7 1.5 8.9 10.2 11.1 12.0 1.9 306
Military in Politics 3.8 0.0 2.4 4.0 5.2 6.0 1.7 306
Religion in Politics 4.6 0.1 4.0 5.0 5.5 6.0 1.3 306
Ethnic Conflict 3.9 0.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 1.3 306
Democratic Accountability 3.8 0.2 2.7 4.0 5.0 6.0 1.5 306
Bureoucracy Quality 2.2 0.0 1.2 2.0 3.0 4.0 1.1 306
Appendix Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics 
This  table presents  descriptive s tatis tics  for our cross  country panel  dataset spanning from 1980-2007. Annual  data was  transformed into decadal  averages . 
Private and Household Saving are expressed as  percentage units  of GDP. Risk i s  ca lculated as  the s tandard deviation of rea l  GDP growth over the decade. 
Appendix table 1 summarizes  the variables  defini tions  and sources . 
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Regressor (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
-0.13 -0.67 0.06 -0.24 0.05
(0.60) (0.38) (0.65) (0.31) (0.61)
-0.47** -0.17*** -0.21* -0.03 0.11
(0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.51) (0.50)
9.31*** 15.48*** 13.75** 10.28*** 0.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.90)
Sample
Developing & 
Transition
Advanced 
Economies
All Countries All Countries All Countries
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO YES
Time Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 44 50 94 94 94
R-squared 0.10 0.16 0.91 0.15 0.92
Appendix Table 3: Household Saving and Risk, alternative specifications
Dependent variable is Household Saving over GDP
Risk (t-1)
Real GDP per capita (t)
Constant
This  table reports  results  relating average household saving rates  to macroeconomic risk. The regress ions  
control  for  rea l  GDP per capita l  (level ). Column (i ) corresponds  to the subsample of developing and 
trans i tion economies ; column (i i ) corresponds  to the subsample of advanced economies ; Column (i i i ) i s  the 
regress ion with country fixed effects ; column (iv) i s  the regress ion with time fixed effects ; and column (v) i s  
the regress ion with country and time fixed effects .  The panel  spans  the 1980-2007 period; however annual  
data was  transformed into decadal  averages . Method of estimation is  Pooled OLS, including dummies  for FE. 
Al l  speci fications  are estimated with robust s tandard errors  (p va lues  in parenthes is ).  *, **, *** indicate 
s igni ficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels , respectively. 
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Regressor (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
-0.40** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.42** -0.38** -0.44** -0.43** -0.40** -0.26
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.12)
1.10***
(0.00)
0.47**
(0.04)
0.44*
(0.05)
0.31
(0.25)
1.25***
(0.00)
-0.47
(0.21)
0.53*
(0.09)
0.53
(0.20)
3.10***
(0.00)
0.02 0.10*** 0.10** 0.13*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.11** -0.06
(0.60) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.19)
11.57*** 13.98*** 13.55*** 14.02*** 13.10*** 18.95*** 15.10*** 15.15*** 11.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278
R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.20
This  table reports  results  relating average private saving rates  to macroeconomic risk. The regress ions  control  for rea l  GDP per capita l  (level ). Depending on the speci fication, 
the regress ions  control  for a l ternative proxies  of insti tutional  qual i ty from ICRG. The panel  spans  the 1980-2007 period; however annual  data was  transformed into decadal  
averages . Method of estimation is  Pooled OLS. Al l  speci fications  are estimated with robust s tandard errors  (p va lues  in parenthes is ).  *, **, *** indicate s igni ficance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels , respectively. 
Bureoucracy Quality (t)
Appendix Table 4: Private Saving and Risk, additional controls
Internal Conflict (t)
Real GDP per capita (t)
Constant
External Conflict (t)
Military in Politics (t)
Religion in Politics (t)
Ethnic Conflict (t)
Democratic 
Accountability (t)
Dependent variable is Private Saving over GDP
Risk (t-1)
Socieconomic 
conditions (t)
Investment Profile (t)
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Regressor (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
-0.44* -0.33 -0.43* -0.42* -0.45* -0.47** -0.40 -0.42 -0.34
(0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.02) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18)
0.27
(0.51)
-0.74***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.96)
-0.24
(0.66)
0.28
(0.63)
-1.66**
(0.02)
0.48
(0.40)
-0.13
(0.84)
2.21**
(0.01)
-0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14**
(0.26) (0.81) (0.42) (0.47) (0.28) (0.71) (0.24) (0.67) (0.02)
8.53*** 15.09*** 9.98** 12.27** 8.84*** 17.47*** 7.76** 10.30*** 4.77**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.09
This  table reports  results  relating average household saving rates  to macroeconomic risk. The regress ions  control  for rea l  GDP per capita l  (level ). Depending on the 
speci fication, the regress ions  control  for a l ternative proxies  of insti tutional  qual i ty from ICRG. The panel  spans  the 1980-2007 period; however annual  data was  
transformed into decadal  averages . Method of estimation is  Pooled OLS. Al l  speci fications  are estimated with robust s tandard errors  (p va lues  in parenthes is ).  *, **, *** 
indicate s igni ficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels , respectively. 
Internal Conflict (t)
Appendix Table 5: Household Saving and Risk, additional controls
Dependent variable is Household Saving over GDP
Risk (t-1)
Socieconomic 
conditions (t)
Investment Profile (t)
Real GDP per capita (t)
Constant
External Conflict (t)
Military in Politics (t)
Religion in Politics (t)
Ethnic Conflict (t)
Democratic 
Accountability (t)
Bureoucracy Quality (t)
